On Napoleon's Tactics

Abstract

This is a succinct recount of Napoleon Bonaparte as a general and tactician. Was he a good general or tactician? Or was he just lucky? Find out for yourself with the research I've done for my midterm.

On Napoleon

Throughout Napoleon Bonaparte's career as a general, he has won a considerable amount of battles. To illustrate his skills as a general, Napoleon, was able to defeat the combined efforts of the Piedmontese and Austrian armies in about a year (G Parker 2009: 197). Furthermore, in 1798 Napoleon even was successful in destroying a “large Mameluke army at the battle of the Pyramids”. In fact, if the British did not intervene and destroy Napoleon’s fleet, it would have been possible for Napoleon to have successfully taken over Egypt (G Parker 2009: 197). However, with this in mind, what factors allowed Napoleon to achieve his success? And furthermore, what factors led Napoleon’s downfall?

Napoleonic Changes

According to Geoffrey Parker, one of the reasons why Napoleon was able to win so many battles was because “he inherited the legacy of the revolutionary army, including a dedicated soldiery” (G Parker 2009: 197). It can be seen that because he had a army that is spirited by a revolution, they are more willing to fight harder as compared to the enemy army. Not only this, but the shared experience of the revolution, seems to have created a sense of pride that the soldiers can reflect upon. And with this shared experience, it creates more loyalty between the soldiers. Further more Parker goes on and mentions “an officer corps based on talent, generals proven in battle, and a flexible tactical system superior to those of France’s enemies (G Parker 2009: 197). The officer corp based on talent is different from past methods of officer recruiting. In the past, only Lords and Nobles were allowed to become officers. Because of this change, it can be seen as creating a army more loyal to its leaders. As for Napoleon's more flexible tactical system, it is based on the use of “battalions in column and line...French cavalry...(and) artillery” (G Parker 2009: 198). Because of this more flexible tactical system, it essentially forced enemy armies to either “fight or retreat” (M Seehan 2010: 46).
Another defining feature to Napoleon’s army is the sheer size of his forces. Because of the Jordan law of 1798, there was a “universal conscription that required all young men to register” (G Parker 2009: 198). Because of this, Napoleon’s army was incredible in size. In fact, when Napoleon invaded Russia, he set out with six hundred thousand troops (M Seehan 2010: 46). However, because of the large size of Napoleon’s troops, he had to find a new way to organize them. Napoleon’s idea to reorganize them came through the creation of “army corps”. These army corps were fifty thousand men small armies comprised of “infantry, artillery, and cavalry units (M Seehan 2010: 46). Through these army corps, it allowed Napoleon to keep his large army while having the flexibility of a smaller army. With this in mind, because of the combination of the large size of troops, and the tactical flexibility of Napoleon’s army, both can be seen as reasons why Napoleon was able to dominate the battlefield for such a long period of time.

Beginning of the End

With all of the tactical changes Napoleon has introduced, why was Napoleon able to be defeated in Russia? Essentially what caused the downfall of Napoleon? The main reason why Napoleon was defeated in Russia was due to the size of Napoleon’s army. With such a large size, how will he be able to supply his men? One method of supplying an army is through “supply depots” in which the armies would carry their supplies with them (M Seehan 2010: 46). However, because the army had to carry their supplies it would make them less flexible and much slower. Because of this, instead of the use of supply depots, Napoleon resorted to the method of “(foraging) ruthlessly in the territories through which it marched.” (M Seehan 2010: 47). But how did the “foraging” method lead to Napoleon’s downfall in Russia? It is simple, when Napoleon invaded Russia, it was winter and Napoleon came unprepared for Russia’s winter weather. Not only this but the Russian’s also burned down Moscow to possibly prevent Napoleon from gaining any tactical advantage (G Parker 2009: 205). So with this in mind, due to Napoleon’s foraging supply method, he was not able to adequately supply his troops and essentially forced Napoleon to retreat. Not only this, however, Napoleon’s foraging efforts has created unintended consequences that would furthermore lead to Napoleon’s downfall in Russia. One of them is fact that foraging off of enemy territory can be seen as to make more enemies then allies. In fact, according to Michael Seehan “(guerrilla warfare) against the French (came) from the peasants who had suffered at their hands.” (M Seehan 2010: 47). Because of this, it could be seen as a hindrance to Napoleon’s army in succeeding in Russia. Another unintended consequence from using foraging is that it makes your war an “offensive war” (M Seehan 2010: 47). As best illustrated by Jonathan Riley “in strategic terms, he was a failure principally because he never succeeded in transforming a defeated enemy into a willing ally.” (J Riley 2007). With this in mind, if Napoleon had stuck to the “supply depot” method of supplying his troops, there would have been a better chance of Napoleon creating allies that would help him in future battles.

Conclusion

In recapitulation, Napoleon had a myriad of tactical changes to his advantage. The large amount of troops and the flexibility of his tactics allowed Napoleon to dominate all the way until he reached Russia. However, due to his ineffective “foraging” supply method, Napoleon’s downfall was inevitable from the beginning.


Bibliography

Parker, G (2009) Cambridge Illustrated History Warfare. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press pp. 197, 198, & 205

Riley, J. (2007). How Good Was Napoleon?. History Today, 57(7), 37-39.

Seehan, M & Baylis, J (eds.)(2010) “The Evolution of Modern Warfare” Strategy in the Contemporary World. NY: Oxford University Press pp. 46 & 47